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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEVE AMICONE, 




Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 10736 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This action was brought against Kennecott Cop-
per Corporation by Steve Amicone who was an em-
ployee for ove1· 28 years for disability benefits under 
the Kennecott Copper Corporation Retirement Plan 
f<ll' salaried employees. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was tried to a jury on Special Inter-
rnga tories. The Court determined that the jury's an-
swers thereto favored the defendant, Kennecott 
Copper Corporation and directed the Entry of Judg-
ment in its favor. 
1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant Steve Amicone seeks a reversal of 
the judgment in the Lower Court and judgment in 
his favor as a matter of law, or that failing, a new 
trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff, Steve Amicone, had for many years 
been employed by Kennecott Copper Corporation as 
a manual laborer ( R. 62). He was first employed 
by the defendant at age 18 in 1936 and had been con-
tinuously employed by the defendant (except for 
U. S. Army Service during World War II) from 1936 
until January 19, 1965, (Exhibit 3-p). 
At the time plaintiff went to work for Kenne-
cott Copper Corporation at the age of 18 he had 91/2 
years schooling, approximately, and had had no 
special job training ( R. 62). 
His first job at Kennecott was on the track gang 
and his duties were repairing and replacing tracks 
and ties ( R. 63) . He worked in this department for 
approximately 3 to 4 years. Early in 1941 he trans-
ferred to the job of machinist helper ( R. 64). His 
duties in this job included oiling and cleaning ma- , 
chinery and bulldozers. 
In December 1941 he was inducted into the 
service and returned to civilian life in October, 1945 
( R. 64) . He was again em ployed at Kennecott as a 
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machinist helper and performed much the same 
duties as he had performed before he entered the 
1nilita1·y service (R. 65). He remained on the job for 
only about six months and then transferred to the 
geographical department which is now known as 
the Quality Control Department. His duties in this 
job required him to work on the various levels at the 
mine at Bingham Canyon and collect samples from 
the drill holes for analysis at the assay office. His 
job was to collect samples weighing approximately 
1 pound and these would be placed in bags and labeled 
and then from 25 to 50 samples would be tied in a 
bundle and he would take these to the assay office 
from the drill site (R. 65). 
Sometime in 1957 or 1958 while walking down a 
ramp from one level of the mine to another plaintiff 
slipped on some ice, fell and injured his lower back 
(R. 67 and 68). From that time on plaintiff had 
trouble with his lower back and his physical ability 
to do manual labor became progressively impaired 
(R. 69). 
In 1961 in order to avoid the walking and climb-
ing necessary to his job of collecting ore samples 
plaintiff secured a transfer to the Kennecott Re-
search Center at the University of Utah. His duties 
on this job required him to break down large ore 
samples for analysis by the technical staff. The ore 
is brought to the center by truck, loaded into bins. 
They are then moved by for kl if t and crushed by 
machinery. Samples were then mixed and shoveled 
by plaintiff and other employees ( R. 69 & 70). Plain-
tiff continued on this job of manual labor of breaking 
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down and shoveling ore samples until January, 1966, 
at which time he was discharged by defendant. 
The blue slip, or separation notice, given to the 
plaintiff by Kennecott shows: "Discharged because 
of illness." (Ex. 3-P) 
The plaintiff's physical history dates from the 
accidental low back injury he suffered at the Bing-
ham Canyon Mine in 1957 or 1958. He was first 
treated by doctors Jenkins and Sorenson, who were 
the company doctors at Bingham, Utah (R. 67). He 
was hospitalized briefly in 1959 for therapy (R. 68), 
then in June of 1963, Dr. Peter Lindstrom operated 
on the plaintiff's back at the Salt Lake County Hos-
pital and evidently removed a disc from the lower 
lumbar area of the spine (R. 70); however, this 
surgery did not improve the plaintiff's condition and 
he continued to experience pain in his low back while 
performing the duties associated with his job ( R. 71). 
He was required to be on his feet all day and do 
shoveling and this would produce pain in his low 
back (R. 71). Eventually the pain became such that 
he had to give up shoveling entirely and this portion 
of his job was taken over by his fellow employees 
(R.71). 
After Dr. Lindstrom left this area for California 
plaintiff transferred to Dr. Mark Greene, an ortho-
pedic surgeon. Dr. Greene gave him direct novo-
caine shots in the back and he was required to take 
a prescription for pain killers (R. 71). 
In April of 1964 the plaintiff was again hos-
pitalized with arthritis and bursitis of the shoulder. 
For several months prior to this hospitalization he 
was given cortisone shots which did not help. His 
shoulder and arm became "stiff and locked." During 
the hospitalization in the Spring of 1964 he was put 
under general anesthetic and the arm and shoulder 
were manipulated in an attempt to restore motion to 
the arm and shoulder ( R. 72) . 
After hospitalization in the Spring of 1964 and a 
period of recuperation Dr. Greene suggested that he 
return to work but that he avoid any lifting or 
shoveling ( R. 79). Plaintiff contacted his superiors 
at the Research Center and was advised to have a 
physical examination by Dr. E. B. Kuhe, the company 
doctor, before he returned to work. He had the physi-
cal examination and again met with the superiors 
at Kennecott sometime in December, 1964 (R. 82-84). 
Plaintiff was informed that because of his physical 
impairment that there was no job available for him 
at the Research Center ( R. 87-88). 
Later the plaintiff met with Mr. Flynn who is 
the personnel director for the Kennecott Copper 
Corporation, Western Division, concerning the possi-
bility of his returning to some job with the company. 
The result of this meeting was a letter from Mr. H. 
H. Spedden (Exhibit 2-B) director of the Research 
Cente1· which states: 
"Dear Mr. Amicone: 
This is to advise you that after consulta-
tion with Mr. E. J. Flynn, your termination 
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at the Kennecott Research Center was neces-
sary because there are no jobs available which 
you are physically able to fill and it is antici-
pated that no such jobs will be available in 
the future. 
Termination on this basis carries with it 
the following consequences: Your group life 
insurance, accidental death and dismember-
ment insurance, weekly accident and sickness 
insurance and hospital, medical, surgical COY· 
erage terminated on January 19, 1965, the 
date of your discharge. 
Very truly yours, 
/s/ H. R. Spedden" 
Plaintiff Steve Amicone was a salaried employee 
of Kennecott Copper Corporation and had been con-
tinuously employed for at least a period of ten years 
before his discharge. As such he was entitled to the 
benefits of the "Kennecott Retirement Plan for 
Salaried Employees." The sole question for deter-
mination before the Lower Court was whether the 
plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled under 
the terms of the plan. Medical evidence was, of course, 
essential to a determination of this question and three 
doctors testified regarding the physical condition of 
the plaintiff. 
Dr. E. B. Kuhe: 
Dr. E. B. Kuhe testified on behalf of the plain-
tiff. He has practiced medicine in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, for a number of years and is qualified as a 
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general surgeon. For twenty years he was an em-
ployee of Kennecott Copper Corporation and for the 
last ten years has been retained by the company on 
an annual retainer. He has no formal training in the 
field of orthopedics and does no surgery in this field 
(R. 96-97). 
Dr. Kuhe first became acquainted with the 
plaintiff in 1963 when the plaintiff transferred from 
the mine to the research division. Plaintiff was given 
a general physical examination at that time and Dr. 
Kuhe obtained a history from him that indicated that 
he had had a laminectomy by Dr. Lindstrom and that 
he had had back trouble since the laminectomy and 
that he had had a good deal of physical therapy ( R. 
97-98). 
Dr. Kuhe at that time diagnosed the plaintiff's 
physical condition as chronic back trouble; that he 
was unable to do his job in Bingham; and that he 
had stiffness in his shoulders (R. 98). The x-rays 
of the lower back of the plaintiff did not show lamin-
ectomy too well because possibly just a small "bite" 
was taken off the lamina but the x-rays did show a 
compression or narrowing of the intervertebral space 
between the 5th lumbar and the 1st sacrum (R. 99). 
In his notes Dr. Kube states: "Since (he) is an old 
employee ( 27 years) I believe he should be given a 
chance." 
Dr. Kube next examined the plaintiff on or 
about the 25th day of July, 1964. This was more 
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or less an oral examination. The plaintiff came to 
him stating that he was supposed to go to work and 
that he was under the care then of Dr. Greene and 
could not go to work ( R. 100). 
Dr. Kuhe next examined the plaintiff on or 
about the 11th of November, 1964. He examined the 
plaintiff at that time for spasm and for mobility of 
the shoulder and back and re-x-rayed the plaintiff's 
back. At that time the doctor found that the plaintiff 
could move his right arm only to a horizontal position 
whereas normal movement would be to a vertical 
position. He also found that lateral movement of the 
plaintiff's right arm was restricted; he could move 
his arm behind him only to the crease on his trouser 
whereas normal movement would be to touch the 
spine. The doctor further found in bending that the 
plaintiff had fair mobility of the back. He could bend 
down to at least horizontal at which time he experi-
enced a spasm or tightening in the lower lumbar 
muscles. There were no changes in the x-rays from 
his examination in 1963 (R. 101-102). 
In the opinion of Dr. Kuhe the plaintiff would 
never again be able to do "hard work-manual labor" 
(R. 103). 
He explained the when he used the term "hard 
work and manual labor" he meant "heavy lifting; 
shoveling; lifting weights greater than 20-25 
pounds; twisting such as you would have to do when 
you shovel," and that plaintiff would not be able to 
stoop 01· bend for long periods ( R. 103). 
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D1·. Kuhe was further of the opinion that assum-
ing no medical intervention that the condition of the 
plaintiff would be permanent (R. 104). 
On cross-examination over plaintiff's objection 
there was introduced in evidence a report signed by 
Dr. Kuhe entitled "Kennecott Copper Corporation 
Retirement Plan for Salaried Employees" (Exhibit 
6-D). In that report the doctor states in substance 
that plaintiff never will be able to do "hard, manual 
labor" but that he could do clerical work, light bench 
work, watchman, or guard. He concludes by stating 
that in his opinion the plaintiff was not totally dis-
abled so as to be prevented thereby from engaging 
in any occupation or employment whatsoever for re-
muneration or profit. 
(as will be noted in the argument below, the 
legal effect of the term "totally disabled" so 
as to be prevented thereby from engaging in 
any occupation or employment whatsoever for 
remuneration or profit is the crux of the case.) 
On re-direct examination when queried as to the 
meaning of the term "totally disabled," Dr. Kuhe 
stated it meant to him that plaintiff could do no work 
at all (R. 115). 
DI'. Boyd G. Holbrook: 
Dr. Holbrook had first seen the plaintiff in con-
sultation with Dr. H. Jenkins in February 2, 1959. 
His examination at that time revealed some evidence 
1if muscle spasm and tenderness, a list or inability to 
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stand completely straight. His x-rays were normal 
and a myelogram showed no evidence of a ruptured 
disc (R. 118-119). 
Dr. Holbrook again examined the plaintiff on 
March 11, 1966, at the instance and request of the 
attorneys for Kennecott Copper Corporation. With· 
out detailing the doctors testimony suffice it to say 
that he found substantially the same physical condi-
tion as did Dr. Kuhe, to-wit: A long history of low 
back trouble treated surgically without apparent re-
lief; bone formation due to irritation; a wearing or 
narrowing of the lumbral-sacral joint and a limita· 
tion of motion of the right arm and shoulder ( R. 126· 
127). 
As far as the plaintiff's employability it was the 
opinion of the doctor that he could carry out work 
requiring a moderate type of activity not involving 
excessive stooping, lifting, or twisting, but that he 
would be unable to engage regularly in manual labor 
(R.128). 
On cross-examination the doctor stated that he 
did not think that Mr. Amicone was totally and per· 
manently disabled and that that term meant to him 
that a person could not expect to be reasonably em· 
playable on a constant or average labor market (R. 
130). 
Dr. Mark H.Greene: 
Dr. Mark H. Greene, a qualified orthopedic 
surgeon and plaintiff's treating physician, was called 
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as a witness by the defendant (R. 134). Plaintiff 
became a patient of Dr. Greene on January 31, 1964. 
At that time plaintiff was given an injection of 
xylocaine and cortisone into the right shoulder to 
alleviate pain and improve the range of motion. He 
saw the plaintiff on several occasions after that. 
There appeared to be no improvement and plaintiff 
was hospitalized on April 22, 1964, for a manipula-
tion of the right shoulder. Plaintiff had considerable 
pain for some months thereafter and at the time 
of the trial the doctor stated that there was still limit-
ed range of moti'on on internal rotation of the shoul-
der. The doctor testified that plaintiff had 25 de-
grees of normal rotation. He continued to treat the 
plaintiff during 1964 and on November 10, 1964, he 
examined him for the purpose of filing a report for 
Kennecott Copper Corporation relative to retirement 
(R.136). 
The doctor on direct examination identified Ex-
hibit 6-D which is a statement by him indicating that 
the plaintiff was not totally disabled so as to be pre-
vented thereby from engaging in any occupation or 
employment whatsoever for remuneration or profit. 
On Cross-examination the doctor testified that 
he reviewed a chart that dated back to January 26, 
1961, but that he saw him for the first time on Janu-
ary 31, 1964. Plaintiff had a history of low back 
pain and a laminectomy operation. At that time Dr. 
G1·eene was concerned only with the shoulder. Later 
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he diagnosed his low back problem as a degenerated 
lumbar disc (R.141). 
He stated further that the plaintiff needed an 
operation for the removal of the disc and a fusion 
and that this type of operation is a serious operation 
and that there is danger attached to it; such as the 
individual reaction to the surgery and possible dam-
age to the spinal cord. He further testified that there 
is not always a good union between vertebrae and 
the fusion operation (R. 143). 
The doctor testified further that the plaintiff 
would not be able to do any occupation that required 
heavy lifting or shoveling. He did state affirmatively 1 
that the plaintiff could do the type of work which 
did not require heavy lifting or twisting (R. 144). 
The doctor did state that the plaintiff could exercise 
providing he learn to take care of his back and that 
bowling would be all right provided he would learn 
how to deliver the ball correctly and stoop correctly. 
He stated further that he would not advise the plain-
tiff to drive truck and indicated that he would not be : 
able to have a job where he was sitting all the time 
and that he could not handle a job where he was stand-
ing all the time unless he learned how to stand with 
one foot off the ground periodically (R. 145). 
The doctor stated in response to the question as 
to what "totally and permanently disabled" meant to 
him by stating that "what it actually means to me, 1 
is, primarily, that a patient cannot work and per-
form his usual work." (R. 145-146) 
1 :2 
POINT I. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ENTER 
JCOG;\IENT FOR PLAINTIFF BASED ON THE ANSWERS 
~JADE BY THE JURY TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORY 
rERDICT. 
The sole question below was whether plaintiff's 
physical impairment entitled him to benefits under 
the Kennecott Retirement Plan. 
The contractual language of this plan is con-
tained in Exhibit 1 Pat page 38 and reads: 
RETIREMENT ON ACCOUNT OF PER-
MANENT AND TOTAL DISABILITY: 
An Employee who is permanently and 
totally disabled shall be retired from the serv-
ice of the Employing Company provided (a) 
he has completed ten ( 10) or more years of 
Continuous Service to the date that his services 
ceased; and (b) his permanent and total dis-
ability has been established in the opinion of a 
qualified physician, designated by the Corpo-
ration. Such an Employee shall become a Pen-
sioner as of the first day of the month follow-
ing the completion of six ( 6) months of such 
permanent and total disability, or, the date 
that the existence of such permanent and total 
disability was established, whichever is later. 
An Emp.loyee who has become a Pensioner pur-
suant to this Subsection 3.2 shall remain a 
Pensioner only so long as his permanent and 
total disability shall continue. The Corpora-
tion shall have the right to verify the continued 
existence of the Pensioner's permanent and 
total disability at reasonable times from time 
to time prior to his 65th birthday. Should 
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the Pensioner refuse to submit to medical ex-
amination, any pension allowance granted 
under this subsection shall be discontinued 
until the withdrawal of the refusal. The exist-
ence or non-existence of permanent and total 
disability on and after such Pensioner's attain-
ment of his 65th birthday shall not be a factor 
in determining the Pensioner's rights under 
the Plan. 
"Permanent and Total Disability" for the , 
purposes of the Plan means disability by bodily 
injury or disease which prevents the Employee 
from engaging in any occupation or employ-
ment whatsoever for remuneration or profit, 
and which disability, in the opinion of a quali-
fied physician appointed by the Corporation, ! 
will be permanent and continuous during the 
remainder of the Employee's lifetime, and 
which an appointee of the Corporation shall de-
termine-
( i) was not contracted suffered or in-
curred while the employee was engaged in, 
or did not result from his having engaged i 
in, a criminal enterprise; and, 
(ii) did not result from his habitual 
drunkenness or addiction to narcotics, or 
self-inflicted injury; and 
(iii) did not result from service in the 
armed forces after July 1, 1951, and for 
whic? the Employee receives a military 
pens10n. 
It is undisputed that plaintiff had worked con-
tinuously for Kennecott for the required ten years-
28 years in fact. 
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The precise legal question was whether the 
plaintiff's disability was permanent and total as con-
templated by the contract. The contract states that 
"permanent and total disability" means "disability 
by bodily injury or disease which prevents the em-
ployee from engaging in any occupation or employ-
ment whatsoever for remuneration or profit, and 
which disability, in the opinion of a qualified physi-
cian appointed by the corporation, will be permanent 
and continuous during the remainder of the employ-
ee's lifetime." 
The foundation of a case such as this must of 
necessity be medical testimony from those experts 
who are familiar with the condition of the plaintiff. 
Under the statement of facts in this case, the testi-
mony of the three doctors concerning the plaintiff's 
condition was set forth quite extensively. We think 
it might reasonably be concluded from this testimony 
that the plaintiff had lower back trouble with de-
generated disc and a demonstrable limitation of mo-
tion in his right arm and shoulder. 
Each doctor also testified as to the limitations 
plaintiff was up against as far as working was con-
<:erned. 
DI'. Kuhe: 
"Never be able to do hard work - manual 
labor." 
15 
When asked what was meant by that the doctor 
said: 
"Heavy lifting; shoveling; lifting weighb 
greater than 20-25 pounds; twisting such as 
you would have to do when you shovel." (R. 
115) 
Dr. Holbrook: 
"It was my opinion that, as far as this mans 
employability was concerned, it would appear 
that he should be able to carry out moderate 
type activity that don't (doesn't) involve ex-
cessive stooping, lifting, or twisting." 
The doctor also stated: 
"It would be my opinion that he would be un-
able to engage, regularly, in manual labor." 
Dr. Greene: 
"Well, I would advise-and probably have ad-
vised Mr. Amicone-primarily, to do a type of 
work which would not require heavy lifting, 
which would be janitorial lifting and didn't 
require using big buffing machines, things like 
that; messenger type of work; painting would 
not hurt him as long as he didn't have to do 
any twisting, heavy lifting-all these things 
you have to watch for all the time, primarily, 
any type of occupation that does not require 
heavy lifting and twisting." 
Surprisingly the doctors varied in their judg-
ment in some respects as to what the plaintiff could 
do. 
Dr. Kuhe: 
"I think he could drive a pick up truck." (R. 
114) 
Dr. Greene: 
"I would advise him not to drive a truck as 
long as he doesn't have surgery and as long 
as he still has trouble with his back." (R. 145) 
The doctors also had differences in opinion as 
to the term "permanent and total disability." 
To Dr. Kuhe it meant: 
"That he can do no work." (R. 115) 
To Dr. Greene it meant: 
"Well, that is a very good question; and what 
it actually means to me, is primarily, that a 
patient cannot work and perform his usual 
work." (R. 146) 
Dr. Holbrook stated: 
"Well, I think, first, that we have to say what, 
to me, this means. And, to me, this means that 
a man cannot reasonably be expected to be 
employable on a constant or average labor 
market." 
The only job the plaintiff ever had was with 
Kennecott Copper Corporation and the only work 
that he ever did for them involved manual labor only. 
He first worked on the track gang many years ago 
which is hard manual labor. He then transferred to 
the machinists ghop which again is hard manual 
labor; he then worked at the mine, bagging and 
earrying samples from drill holes, which involved 
weights of 25 to 50 pounds and the last job he had 
at the time of his discharge was in the Bucking Room 
at the Research Center and this involved breaking 
clown large ore samples, mixing, shoveling, and pre-
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paring them for analysis by the technical staff. This 
also involved heavy manual labor. 
The testimony of the plaintiff was that he could 
no longer do the shoveling necessary to his job and 
therefore he could not perform the duties that he was : 
required to do . Kennecott evidently agreed because 
on his blue slip they state that he was discharged on 
account of illness and in the letter they wrote to him 
they stated that there were no longer any jobs he 
could fill because of his physical disability. The three , 
doctors agreed that the plaintiff could no longer per-
form manual labor meaning shoveling, twisting and 
bending and this is precisely the only thing that the 
plaintiff had ever done and this was the only job 
training that he had ever had. 
So far as the doctors were concerned in their 
testimony the plaintiff would never be able to per-
form manual labor again and to that extent he was 
permanently and totally disabled. Kennecott Copper 
had no further use for him-they fired him when he 
applied for disability benefits on account of illness. 
If Kennecott with its vast array of jobs in the Salt 
Lake Valley had no use for the plaintiff, is there an 
employer in this area that would? We need only call 
on the knowledge common to all of us that when a 
man passes forty ( 40) and becomes disabled his 
worth on the labor market is virtually nil. 
Next, the legal consideration of the facts and 
medical testimony of this case as they might match 
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up to the contractual provision of the Kennecott Disa-
bility Plan as correctly interpreted: 
Kennecott uses this language: "Permanent and 
total disability" "for the purpose of the plan means 
disability by bodily injury or disease which prevents 
the employee from engaging in any occupation or 
employment whatsoever for remuneration or profit." 
This language is not novel or unique but has been 
used for many years in the insurance industry in 
Health and Accident Insurance Plans. This almost 
identical language has been interpreted by this Court 
in the case of Colovos v. Home Life Insurance Com-
vrmy of New York, 28 Pacific 2d 607; 83, Utah 401. 
This was an action by plaintiff to collect under a 
health and accident policy. As in the case at bar, 
the issue was whether plaintiff was totally disabled 
within the meaning of the terms of the policy. The 
background of the plaintiff showed that he possessed 
little education, that he had worked during his early 
years at the Mills in Magna, Utah, but that in recent 
years he had devoted his time to farming and ped-
dling produce; that it was necessary in his work to 
carry packages, sacks and bags weighing from 50 to 
120 pounds and that it was also necessary for him to 
plow and dig. He testified that it was impossible 
for him to do general farm work because both arms 
were necessary in the prosecution of this work. 
The evidence of his medical disability was en-
tirely confined to his right arm and particularly the 
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elbow and wrist which were arthritic. There was a 
difference of medical opinion as to the extent of this 
disability. The medical evidence together with plain-
tiff's testimony as to his inability to do the work that 
he normally did was submitted to the jury on a gen-
eral verdict and the jury found in favor of the plain-
tiff. 
The important question on Appeal was whether 
the evidence was sufficient to show that plaintiff 
was totally and permanently disabled under the 
terms of the policy. The term of the policy which the 
Court was called upon to interpret and construe was 
this : "Disability shall be deemed to be total when-
ever the insured becomes wholly disabled by bodily 
injury or disease so that he is prevent~d thereby from 
engaging in any occupation and performing any work 
for compensation or profit, ... " 
The Court then held: 
"In this matter the court is called upon to 
construe the contract, particularly the scope 
and meaning of the following lines set out in 
the paragraph above quoted: '* * * Prevented 
from engaging in any occupation and perform-
ing any work for compensation or profit.' It 
is the opinion of this court that the terms used, 
'engaging in any occupation and performing 
any work for compensation or profit,' has a 
well-defined meaning. It means ability to fol-
low any recognized occupation, and to do sub-
stantially all the acts that are necessarily and 
usually performed by one who follows that 
occupation. It could not be said that a man 
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could engage in an occupation if he were able 
to do only one or two of the acts customarily 
performed by one engaged in such an occupa-
tion. Furthermore, there is an element of 
continuity in following an occupation; that is, 
the ability to continuously perform substan-
tially all of the ordinary acts which, in the 
ordinary course of events, a man following 
such an occupation is called upon to perform. 
Furthermore, 'compensation or profit,' as used 
in the paragraph quoted from the policy, is 
qualified, and relates to the preceding words, 
'engaging in any occupation and performing 
any work,' and contemplates that the compen-
sation or profit to be received from the occupa-
tion engaged in, or work done, shall, in a fair 
sense, be remunerative, and not merely nomi-
nal, and in the case at bar a small farmer who 
could not do substantially all the labor that 
usually is necessary to be done, or a peddler 
who cannot lift or handle the bags of produce 
he is accustomed to peddle, could not conduct 
his farming or his peddling for profit or com-
pensation in a remunerative sense. 
(Citing cases) 
In this case it is the opinion of the court that 
the foregoing is a proper construction of the 
language of the contract between the parties, 
and that the testimony above set forth in de-
termining whether it is sufficient to show total 
and permanent disability, should be considered 
in view of the foregoing construction of the 
contract or agreement. That being so, the 
question to be determined is whether the plain-
tiff is so disabled that he is prevented from 
engaging in any occupation and performing 
any work of substantially the same kind and 
21 
nature as he was accustomed and able to per-
form prior to the time he became afflicted with 
the disability herein set out. 
From the testimony it is clear that the plain-
tiff is an uneducated man; that his only work 1 
has been farm work and the peddling of farm 
products, with a little work as a common labor-
er in the mills at Magna. The testimony is un-
disputed that he could not get work at Magna 
and the mills because he could not pass the 
physical examination required. There is con-
siderable testimony in the record that a man 
cannot plow and dig, and do general farm 
work without the use of both of his hands; that 
the defendant cannot lift sacks from 50 to 120 
pounds; that he cannot drive a truck used in 
peddling, although he has driven one occasion-
ally since the alleged disability. In view of this 
testimony, it became a question of fact for the 
jury to deternine, under the instructions of the 
court which substantially defined the terms of 
the contract, as herein defined by this court, 
whether or not the disability was total an<l 
permanent.'' 
The Court went on to state that the evidence on 
the question of disability was sufficient to go to the 
jury and further held that this evidence was suffi-
cient to uphold the verdict rendered in favor of the 
plaintiff. 
The parallel between the language of the insur-
ance contract in the Colovos case, Supra, and the 
language of the Kennecott Retirement Plan is ap-
parent. There is no material distinction between 
the two and, of course, the precedent of the interpre-
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tation rendered by this Court in the Colovos case, 
Supra, is binding. Thus, what we are talking about 
in the case at bar, is whether the disability of plain-
tiff was such that he could not now engage in his 
normal occupation of that of manual labor for re-
muneration or profit . 
• 4ll three doctors who testified in the case said 
that he could not do that type of work. 
The next pertinent inquiry is what did the jury 
do with this evidence? 
The case was submitted to the jury on a Special 
Verdict and the questions and answers thereto are 
now quoted: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 15 
SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES 
We, the jury, find from a preponderance of the 
evidence in this case the following answers to 
the questions propounded to us: 
1. Based upon the definition of perman-
ent and total disability heretofore given 
you in these Instructions, did plaintiff, 
Steve Amicone, become totally and per-
manently disabled on or before the 19th 
day of January, 1965? 
Answer: Yes. 
If you answered Question 1 "yes," then 
answer Questions 2 and 3. 
2. Has a qualified physician designated 
by defendant, Kennecott Copper Corpora-
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tion, established in his opinion that plain-
tiff's disability was total? 
Answer: No 
3. Has a qualified physician appointed 
by defendant, Kennecott Copper Corpora-
tion, expressed the opinion that such total 
disability will be permanent and continu-
ous during the remainder of plaintiff's 
lifetime? 
Answer: Yes 
The foregoing answers agreed upon, sign-
ed and returned to court this 2nd day of 
June, 1966. 
/s/ C. W. Millard 
Foreman 
The jury found that the plaintiff was totally 
and permanently disabled as that term was defined 
for them. The term was defined in Instruction No.12 
given by the Court. This instruction reads: 
You are instructed that the term "permanent 
and total disability'' has a specialized meaning 
in the law. It does not mean that the employee 
must be unable to do any work at all; nor does 
it mean that the employee must be bedridden 
and unable to care for himself . It means such 
disability as would prevent the employee-
in this case, the plaintiff-fo1· the rest of his 
lifetime, with any degree of success and within 
the range of his reasonable capabilities, from 
earning wages or p1·ofit in some occupation or 
gainful pursuit. 
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It is not sufficient for the plaintiff to have 
proved by a preponderance of the evidence only 
that he was physically unable to perform his 
normal job with Kennecott. 
This instruction is in accord with the interpre-
tation set forth in the Colovas case. The jury found 
total and permanent disability. And the jury found 
that such total and permanent disability would con-
tinue during the remainder of plaintiff's lifetime 
and that the examining doctor appointed by Kenne-
cott had so found. The plaintiff was victorious. He 
had won his lawsuit. These two findings were suffi-
cient to support a verdict in his favor. The Lower 
Court did not agree. It directed that judgment be 
entered in favor of defendant. Its reasoning was 
based entirely on the Answer to Interrogatory No. 2, 
wherein the jury had stated in effect that the doctor 
designated by Kennecott had not in his opinion stated 
that plaintiff's disability was total. The physician 
designated by Kennecott was Dr. Kuhe and an anal-
ysis of his testimony and report will show that this 
answer to question No. 2 was not determinative of 
this case and in fact the Interrogatory and Answer 
were superflous in view of the other two Answers. 
Dr. Kuhe in his report to Kennecott which was 
introduced in evidence over the objection of plaintiff, 
stated that plaintiff was not totally disabled so as to 
be prevented thereby from engaging in any occupa-
tion or employment whatsoever for remuneration or 
pl'ofit. In his own report, however Dr. Kuhe stated 
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that plaintiff would never be able to do hard, manual 
labor. (Exhibit 5 D) 
Of course, the reason the doctor did not find that 
the plaintiff could not engage in any occupation for 
remuneration or profit is because to his mind the 
term "totally disabled" meant that the man could 
donoworkatall (R.115). 
But, this was not the ultimate question in the 
case, namely as to whether a man could do any work. 
As correctly interpreted and defined by the Court in 
its Instructions the question was whether a man 
could perform substantially all of those tasks asso-
ciated with the work that he ordinarily and custo-
marily performed. 
Inherent in a determination of this problem is 
the man's work history, his education and his train-
ing. The only work that the plaintiff had ever done 
was manual labor; he had no specialized job training; 
and very little education. Plaintiff is totally and per-
manently disabled and the jury in its wisdom so 
found. When Dr. Kuhe on Exhibit 5D answered ques-
tion 3 to the effect that the plaintiff was not totally 
disabled, he necessarily brought to the matter his 
own interpretation of what those words meant and 
to him it meant that a man could not work at all. 
The Court in directing that judgment be entered 
for the defendant, obviously adopted the Answer to 
Interrogatory No. 2 and of necessity then disregard-
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eel the Answer to Interrogatory No. 1 and thus strip-
ped the jury of its Findings on the ultimate issue. 
The argument appellant makes above is much 
better stated by this Court in the Colovos Case, 
Supra. We quote: 
The record shows that the plaintiff visited 
appellant's office in Salt Lake City and pre-
sented his claim. The appellant bases its claim 
on the theory that the action was prematurely 
brought upon the following questions and an-
swers from a questionnaire submitted by the 
appellant to Dr. LaBarge, who treated the 
plaintiff in this case. The questions and an-
swers relied upon are as follows: 
"If the insured is now unable to perform his 
regular duties, is he physically able to engage 
in lighte1· work of some sort, such as light 
clerical or shop work, light housework, light 
outdoor work, chores, etc? If so explain. 
Ans. :No other disability except involvement 
of the right wrist. 
Ques.: Does the disability completely prevent 
the insured from doing work of any kind or in 
engaging in any business or occupation? 
Ans.: No." 
After receiving this report, the appellant noti-
fied the plaintiff it would not allow his claim. 
The plaintiff immediately thereafter brought 
this action. We are of the opinion that this 
objection is without merit. The plaintiff's 
right of action cannot be limited by his physi-
can's report, nor is he bound by his statements. 
33 C. J. 19 ~ 666; Couch Encyc. of Insur. Law 
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~ 2226; Southern Woodmen v. Davis, 124 Ark. 
518, 187 S. W. 638; Carson v. New York Life 
Ins. Co., 162 Minn. 458, 203 N.W. 209. 
If a claimant is not bound by the statements 
of his own doctor there is even less reason to suppose 
that he would be bound by the statements of a doctor 
employed by Kennecott. 
The plaintiff won his lawsuit. The ultimate 
question before the jury was whether he was totally 
and permanently disabled and the jury found that he 
was. The fact that Dr. Kuhe, who was the physician 
appointed by Kennecott to examine the plaintiff on 
his application for disability benefits, did not so state, 
is not binding, and cannot have the effect of annihil-
ating the favorable determination of the jury. In 
this, the Lower Court committed reversible error and 
appellant asks that the judgment be reversed and that 
the Lower Court be directed to enter judgment in his 
favor for the amounts due under the disability plan. 
For comparable authority supporting the Colo-
vos case, Supra, see Couch Cyclopedia of Insurance 
Law, 2d Edition, Section 53 :364 wherein it is stated: 
The ordinary rule applies with respect to disa-
bilities that where issues of fact must be re· 
solved on the basis of conflicting evidence or on 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence the 
question is one for resolution by the jury. B~­
cause of the very nature of the situation, it is 
generally a question for the jury to determine 
whethe1· the insured is disabled, the natui·p 
of the disability, when it commenced and its 
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duration, and whether total and permanent 
or otherwise. . . 
The testimony of a medical expert is not 
requisite in order to justify the submission of 
disability issues to the jury. 
See also Gibson vs. Equitable Life Assurance 
Society, 84 Utah 452, 36 Pac. 2d 105; Miller 
v. New York Life Insurance Company, 84 
Utah 539, 37 Pac. 2d 547; Rawlston vs. Metro-
politan Life Insurance Co., 90 Utah 496, 62 
Pac. 2d 1119; Bucher vs. Equitable Life As-
surance Society, 91 Utah 179, 63 Pac. 2d 604. 
It is anticipated that in response to appellant's 
argument under this point defendant will assert that 
its Pension and Disability Plan was mere gratuity 
on its part; that it did not constitute a part of the 
Employment Contract with its employees and that 
hence its determination as to whether an employee 
is totally and permanently disabled is binding upon 
the employee. It will go further and state that since 
its doctor did not find total and permanent disability 
that the jury has no right to find on that question 
and that therefore an Answer in its favor to Inter-
rogatory No. 2 ends the lawsuit. 
The appellant argues to the contrary that the 
Pension and Disability Plan is a part of Kennecott 
Employment Contract with its employees. This Con-
tract is subject to the interpretation of a Court or 
jury just as any other Contract must bear that scru-
tiny. This Court so held in Schofield vs. Zions Co-
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operative Mercantile Institution, 85 Utah 281, 39 
Pac. 2d 342. 
Since Kennecott chose to adopt language identi- 1 
cal to that contained in insurance contracts covering 
the same subject matter this Court's interpretation 
in that regard is clearly applicable. 
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POINT II. 
THE JURY'S ANSWERS TO SPECIAL INTERROGATOR-
IES ARE INCONSISTENT AND A NEW TRIAL IS RE-
Ql'IRED. 
Appellant has argued that judgment in his favor 
is dictated by reason of the Finding of the jury. With-
out compromising his position in this regard and only 
in the event the Court disagrees with that position, 
he now asks that the Special Verdict of the jury be 
examined in detail and this will show an irreconcil-
able and fatal inconsistency in the jury's Answers. 
The Special Verdict has been set forth earlier 
in this Brief and will not be repeated at this time. 
Suffice it to say, the jury found: 
1. Plaintiff was totally disabled. 
2. That a doctor appointed by Kennecott did 
not find total disability in his opinion. 
3. That he did find that such total disability 
would be continuous throughout the plain-
tiff's lifetime. 
We are now only concerned with the Answers to 
2 and 3. Each refers to total disability. The jury 
was asked whether a doctor appointed by Kennecott 
found total disability and the jury answered "No." 
'I'he jury was then asked whether the doctor express-
ed the opinion that such total disability would be 
permanent and continuous and the jury answered 
"yes." These answers are diametrically opposed. 
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Where, as in this case, the thinking of the jmy 
as expressed in their Answers to Interrogatories ' 
lacks clarity and where there is a clear appearance of , 
inconsistency and indefiniteness a new trial is a nee- , 
essity. This Court so held in Eastern Utah Develop· 
nient Company v. General Insurance Company of , 
America, 17 Utah, 2d 327, 411 Pac. 2d 132. ' 
CONCLUSION 
The question in this case is whether plaintiff is 
permanently and totally disabled. More precisely is 
plaintiff disabled to such an extent that he cannot, 
within his capabilities, and with any degree of suc-
cess pursue some occupation for profit or remunera-
tion. 
Plaintiff had little education and no job training. 
He had worked all his life for defendant doing man-
ual labor. All of the doctors agreed that plaintiff 
could no longer do that type of work. 
Defendant had no further use for plaintiff; it 
discharged him because of illness and made it point-
edly clear to him in a letter that because of his disa· 
bility there was no job available to him at the Re· 
search Center. But, they would not pension him. 
They tell him through their doctor that he is not per-
manently and totally disabled. That he can get a job 
elsewhere doing something. They would agree that he 
cannot do manual labor, but, still they say "he can 
get a job doing something." Obviously they harbor 
the view that if a man can sell pencils on the street 
C'.omer that he is not then totally and permanently 
disabled. Is the disability pension plan which is part 
of their Contract with their employees only for those 
who are helpless and bedridden? Of course not. 
The law does not interpret this term "total disa-
bility" in so narrow a manner, nor does the term 
"total disability" admit of such mathematical cer-
tainty. Determinatian in this area must in a sense 
be personal and subjective. The education, training 
and work experience of the individual must be con-
sidered. These are matters for the jury. 
The jury having before it the evidence of plain-
tiff's experience and the fact that he could no longer 
do the manual labor that he had done all his life under 
a correct legal definition given by the Court in its in-
structions, found that plaintiff was permanently 
and totally disabled. This Finding based upon con-
vincing evidence was sufficient to support a judg-
ment for the plaintiff. The Court erroneously then 
directed judgment be entered for defendant and obvi-
ously did so based upon Answers to Interrogatory 
No. 2, wherein the jury found that Kennecott's doctor 
did not find plaintiff "totally and permanently dis-
abled." That, however, was the ultimate question in 
the case for determination by the jury. The Court in 
effect has taken this prerogative from the jury and 
given it to Dr. Kuhe, defendant's doctor. Expert wit-
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nesses can only assist a jury, they cannot decide tht 
case for them. 
Appellant, Steve Amicone, asks, on the basis of 
the jury Finding, based on sufficient evidence, that 
this Court reverse the Trial Court, and direct that 
judgment be entered in his favor. If this Court can-
not agree with that position then clearly a new trial 
must be granted on the basis of inconsistent An-
swers to Interrogatories. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & GARRETT 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Appellant 
520 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
